# MotoVaultPro Software Audit Report

**Document Version:** 1.0
**Classification:** Internal/Confidential
**Audit Date:** December 13, 2025
**Application Version:** 1.0.0
**Architecture:** 5-Container Single-Tenant Docker Stack

---

## 1. Executive Summary

### 1.1 High-Level Assessment

**MotoVaultPro** is an automotive vehicle management platform built on a modern 5-container Docker architecture. The application demonstrates solid architectural foundations with proper authentication, modular feature design, and production-ready deployment configuration.

### 1.2 Key Findings Summary

| Category | Rating | Critical | High | Medium | Low |
|----------|--------|----------|------|--------|-----|
| **Security** | 6.5/10 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 |
| **Code Quality** | 8.3/10 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| **Architecture** | 8.5/10 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| **Data Integrity** | 7.5/10 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| **Performance** | 8.0/10 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| **Compliance** | 7.0/10 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 |

### 1.3 Overall Production Readiness

**Verdict: CONDITIONALLY READY**

The application requires remediation of **1 critical** and **2 high-severity** security issues before production deployment:

1. **CRITICAL**: Cryptographically insecure random number generation for document storage keys
2. **HIGH**: Inadequate file upload validation (no magic byte verification)
3. **HIGH**: Google Maps API key exposure to frontend clients

---

## 2. Scope and Methodology

### 2.1 Audit Scope

**In Scope:**
- Source code review (backend/src, frontend/src)
- Docker/container configuration analysis
- Database schema and migration review
- Authentication and authorization mechanisms
- API security assessment
- Infrastructure security review
- Compliance assessment for Australian automotive context

**Out of Scope:**
- External penetration testing
- Third-party dependency deep audit (surface-level only)
- Production infrastructure assessment
- Physical security controls

### 2.2 Methodology

**Standards Applied:**
- OWASP Top 10 2021
- OWASP API Security Top 10 2023
- Australian Privacy Act 1988 considerations
- ACCC consumer data protection guidelines

**Tools and Techniques:**
- Manual code review
- Static analysis via TypeScript compiler (strict mode)
- Configuration file analysis
- Architecture documentation review
- Test coverage analysis

### 2.3 Components Reviewed

| Component | Path | Status |
|-----------|------|--------|
| Backend API | `backend/src/` | Full review |
| Frontend SPA | `frontend/src/` | Full review |
| Docker Config | `docker-compose.yml` | Full review |
| Traefik Config | `config/traefik/` | Full review |
| Database Migrations | `backend/src/features/*/migrations/` | Full review |

### 2.4 Feature Capsules Reviewed

| Feature | Test Coverage | Implementation Status |
|---------|---------------|----------------------|
| vehicles | Full suite | Complete |
| platform | Unit + Integration | Complete |
| documents | Unit + Integration | Complete |
| fuel-logs | Basic tests | Complete |
| maintenance | Basic tests | Complete |
| stations | Basic tests | Partial |
| admin | Unit + Integration | Complete |

---

## 3. Detailed Findings

### 3.a Architecture and Environment

**Rating: 8.5/10**

#### Strengths

- **5-Container Architecture**: Well-designed Docker deployment with Traefik, Frontend, Backend, PostgreSQL, and Redis
- **Feature Capsule Pattern**: Self-contained modules in `backend/src/features/{name}/` enable clear separation
- **K8s-Ready Design**: Health probes (`/health`, `/health/ready`, `/health/live`, `/health/startup`), container orchestration, secret management via mounted files
- **Network Segmentation**: Three Docker networks with appropriate isolation:
  - `frontend` (10.96.1.0/24) - Public-facing
  - `backend` (10.96.20.0/24) - API services
  - `database` (10.96.64.0/24) - Internal only
- **Production-Only Containers**: All services run production builds

#### Concerns

| Severity | Finding | Location |
|----------|---------|----------|
| MEDIUM | Single-tenant limitations (no multi-tenancy support) | Architecture design |
| LOW | Platform module tightly coupled to backend | `backend/src/features/platform/` |

#### Key Files
- `/docker-compose.yml` - Container orchestration
- `/config/traefik/traefik.yml` - Reverse proxy configuration
- `/config/traefik/middleware.yml` - Security middleware
- `/backend/src/features/` - Feature capsule structure

---

### 3.b Code Quality and Maintainability

**Rating: 8.3/10**

#### Strengths

- **Strict TypeScript Configuration**: All strict compiler options enabled
  ```json
  {
    "strict": true,
    "noUnusedLocals": true,
    "noUnusedParameters": true,
    "noImplicitReturns": true,
    "exactOptionalPropertyTypes": true,
    "noUncheckedIndexedAccess": true
  }
  ```
- **Test Coverage**: 5,872 lines of test code across 15+ test files
- **Structured Logging**: Winston logger with JSON format
- **Input Validation**: Zod schemas for all API inputs
- **Repository Pattern**: Clean data access separation

#### Concerns

| Severity | Finding | Impact |
|----------|---------|--------|
| MEDIUM | 299 uses of `any` type in backend | Reduced type safety |
| MEDIUM | No ESLint configuration in backend | Inconsistent code style |
| LOW | No Prettier configuration | Formatting inconsistency |
| LOW | Missing React Error Boundaries on some pages | Unhandled UI errors |

#### Key Files
- `/backend/tsconfig.json` - TypeScript strict configuration
- `/frontend/eslint.config.js` - Frontend linting (backend missing)
- `/backend/jest.config.js` - Test configuration

---

### 3.c Data Integrity and Functional Accuracy

**Rating: 7.5/10**

#### Strengths

- **Referential Integrity**: Foreign key constraints with `ON DELETE CASCADE`
- **Soft Deletes**: `deleted_at` column on vehicles for audit trail
- **VIN Validation**: Check digit algorithm at application layer
- **Unique Constraints**: `UNIQUE(user_id, vin)` prevents duplicates
- **Migration Tracking**: `_migrations` table prevents re-execution

#### Concerns

| Severity | Finding | Risk |
|----------|---------|------|
| HIGH | No PostgreSQL Row-Level Security (RLS) | Cross-user data exposure if SQL injection occurs |
| MEDIUM | Soft delete orphan risk (cascading deletes are hard deletes) | Data consistency issues |

#### Key Files
- `/backend/src/features/vehicles/migrations/` - Schema definitions
- `/backend/src/features/vehicles/data/vehicles.repository.ts` - Data access

---

### 3.d Security Assessment

**Rating: 6.5/10**

#### Strengths

- **Auth0 OIDC Integration**: Industry-standard authentication via `@fastify/jwt` and `get-jwks`
- **JWT Validation**: JWKS-based public key retrieval with issuer validation
- **HTTPS Enforcement**: Traefik automatic HTTP-to-HTTPS redirect
- **Security Headers**: HSTS, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options via Traefik
- **Docker Secrets**: Password management via `/run/secrets/` pattern
- **Rate Limiting**: 50 req/min average, 100 burst via Traefik
- **Admin Guard**: Role-based access control for admin endpoints

#### Critical Finding

**CRITICAL: Insecure Random Number Generation**

| Attribute | Value |
|-----------|-------|
| Location | `backend/src/features/documents/api/documents.controller.ts:321-324` |
| Issue | Document storage keys generated using `Math.random()` |
| Code | `Math.random().toString(36).slice(2) + Date.now().toString(36)` |
| Risk | Predictable file paths could allow unauthorized document access |
| CVSS Score | 8.1 (High) |
| Remediation | Replace with `crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('hex')` |

#### High Severity Findings

**HIGH: Inadequate File Upload Validation**

| Attribute | Value |
|-----------|-------|
| Location | `backend/src/features/documents/api/documents.controller.ts:205-216` |
| Issue | MIME type validation based on Content-Type header only |
| Risk | Malicious files with spoofed Content-Type bypass validation |
| CVSS Score | 7.5 (High) |
| Remediation | Implement magic byte (file signature) validation |

**HIGH: API Key Exposure**

| Attribute | Value |
|-----------|-------|
| Location | `backend/src/features/stations/external/google-maps/` |
| Issue | Google Maps API key exposed in photo URLs to frontend |
| Risk | API key abuse, quota exhaustion, billing impact |
| CVSS Score | 6.5 (Medium-High) |
| Remediation | Proxy requests through backend or use referrer restrictions |

#### Medium and Low Findings

| Severity | Finding | Location |
|----------|---------|----------|
| MEDIUM | No PostgreSQL Row-Level Security | Database schema |
| LOW | Missing Content-Security-Policy header | `config/traefik/middleware.yml` |
| LOW | Traefik dashboard enabled with `api.insecure: true` | `config/traefik/traefik.yml` |

#### Key Security Files
- `/backend/src/core/plugins/auth.plugin.ts` - JWT validation (reviewed - well implemented)
- `/backend/src/core/plugins/admin-guard.plugin.ts` - Admin authorization
- `/backend/src/core/config/config-loader.ts` - Secrets loading
- `/config/traefik/middleware.yml` - Security headers

---

### 3.e Performance and Reliability

**Rating: 8.0/10**

#### Strengths

- **Redis Caching Strategy**: Tiered TTLs
  - User data: 5 minutes
  - Dropdown data: 6 hours
  - VIN decode: 7 days
- **Connection Pooling**: PostgreSQL with pool management
- **Circuit Breaker**: Traefik circuit breaker for external API failures
- **Health Checks**: Container-level probes with appropriate intervals
- **Compression**: Traefik compression middleware enabled

#### Concerns

| Severity | Finding | Impact |
|----------|---------|--------|
| MEDIUM | No database query optimization evidence | Performance under load |
| LOW | Fixed connection pool size (10) | May be insufficient at scale |

---

### 3.f Compliance and Audit Trails

**Rating: 7.0/10**

#### Australian Regulatory Context
- **Privacy Act 1988**: Personal information handling
- **ACCC**: Consumer data protection guidelines
- **Automotive Industry**: Standard data protection applies

#### Strengths

- **Data Isolation**: User-scoped data with `user_id` filtering
- **Admin Audit Trail**: `admin_audit_logs` table for admin actions
- **Soft Deletes**: Vehicles retained for compliance
- **VIN Masking**: Security documentation mentions log masking

#### Concerns

| Severity | Finding | Risk |
|----------|---------|------|
| HIGH | No general-purpose audit table for user actions | Cannot demonstrate data access history |
| MEDIUM | No documented data retention policy | Privacy Act "right to erasure" gap |
| LOW | No consent management or data export functionality | Privacy compliance gap |

---

## 4. Recommendations and Remediation Plan

### 4.1 Priority 0 - Immediate (Before Production)

| # | Finding | Remediation | File | Effort |
|---|---------|-------------|------|--------|
| 1 | Math.random() for storage keys | Replace with `crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('hex')` | `documents.controller.ts:321-324` | 2h |
| 2 | File upload MIME validation | Implement magic byte validation using `file-type` library | `documents.controller.ts:205-216` | 4h |
| 3 | Google Maps API key exposure | Proxy photo requests through backend | `stations/external/google-maps/` | 4h |

### 4.2 Priority 1 - Short-Term (Week 2-4)

| # | Finding | Remediation | Effort |
|---|---------|-------------|--------|
| 4 | Missing RLS policies | Implement PostgreSQL Row-Level Security | 8h |
| 5 | No general audit logging | Add `audit_logs` table for user actions | 16h |
| 6 | Content-Security-Policy | Add CSP header to Traefik middleware | 2h |
| 7 | 299 `any` types | Gradual type refinement, prioritize controllers | 16h |

### 4.3 Priority 2 - Medium-Term (Month 2-3)

| # | Finding | Remediation | Effort |
|---|---------|-------------|--------|
| 8 | ESLint configuration | Add comprehensive ESLint config to backend | 4h |
| 9 | Prettier configuration | Add `.prettierrc` and format codebase | 2h |
| 10 | Error Boundary coverage | Wrap all feature pages in error boundaries | 8h |
| 11 | Data retention policy | Document and implement retention rules | 16h |

### 4.4 Priority 3 - Long-Term Recommendations

1. **External Penetration Test**: Commission third-party security assessment
2. **Dependency Audit**: Implement automated CVE scanning in CI/CD
3. **Multi-Tenancy Planning**: Architect for future multi-tenant requirements
4. **Compliance Documentation**: Formalize privacy policy and data handling procedures
5. **Performance Baseline**: Establish load testing and performance monitoring

---

## 5. Conclusion

### 5.1 Production Readiness Verdict

**CONDITIONALLY READY**

MotoVaultPro demonstrates a well-architected foundation with:
- Proper authentication integration (Auth0 OIDC)
- Production-ready Docker deployment
- Feature capsule pattern for modularity
- Comprehensive test coverage (5,872+ lines)
- Strict TypeScript configuration

However, **three security issues must be addressed before production deployment**:

1. **CRITICAL**: Replace `Math.random()` with `crypto.randomBytes()` in document storage
2. **HIGH**: Implement magic byte validation for file uploads
3. **HIGH**: Remove API key exposure from frontend

### 5.2 Estimated Remediation Timeline

| Phase | Issues | Effort | Timeline |
|-------|--------|--------|----------|
| P0 - Critical | 3 issues | 10 hours | Week 1 |
| P1 - High | 4 issues | 42 hours | Weeks 2-4 |
| P2 - Medium | 4 issues | 30 hours | Month 2-3 |

### 5.3 Final Notes

Upon remediation of CRITICAL and HIGH findings, this application will be suitable for production deployment with ongoing monitoring and execution of the medium-term action plan.

---

## Appendix: Critical Files for Remediation

### Security Fixes Required
- `/backend/src/features/documents/api/documents.controller.ts` - Lines 321-324, 205-216
- `/backend/src/features/stations/external/google-maps/google-maps.client.ts` - Photo URL generation
- `/config/traefik/middleware.yml` - Add Content-Security-Policy

### Database Schema Additions
- New migration for Row-Level Security policies
- New `audit_logs` table for user action tracking

### Configuration Updates
- `/config/traefik/traefik.yml` - Disable dashboard in production
- `/backend/.eslintrc.js` - New file for backend linting
- `/.prettierrc` - New file for code formatting
